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Abstract
Low degree Reed-Muller codes are known to satisfy local decoding properties which
find applications in private information retrieval (PIR) protocols, for instance. However,
their practical instantiation encounters a first barrier due to their poor information rate
in the low degree regime. This lead the community to design codes with similar local
properties but larger dimension, namely the lifted Reed-Solomon codes.
However, a second practical barrier appears when one requires that the PIR protocol
resists collusions of servers. In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem by
considering weighted Reed-Muller codes. We prove that such codes allow us to build
PIR protocols with optimal computation complexity and resisting to a small number of
colluding servers.
In order to improve the dimension of the codes, we then introduce an analogue of
the lifting process for weigthed degrees. With a careful analysis of their degree sets, we
notably show that the weighted lifting of Reed-Solomon codes produces families of codes
with remarkable asymptotic parameters.
1 Introduction
1.1 Weighted Reed-Muller codes
Weighted Reed-Muller codes were introduced by Sørensen in 1992, as a generalisation of
Reed-Muller codes in the context of weighted polynomial rings [Sør92]. Formally, given a
finite field Fq, a weight ω = (ω1, . . . ,ωm) ∈ (N∗)m and a polynomial
P(X1, . . . , Xm) = ∑
i=(i1,...,im)∈I
piXi1 . . . Xim ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , Xm],
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the weighted degree of P with respect to ω is
wdegω(P) := max
{
m
∑
j=1
ωjij | i = (i1, . . . , im) ∈ I and pi 6= 0
}
.
In particular, if ω = (1, . . . , 1), then we get the usual notion of total degree for multivariate
polynomials.
In order to build codes from subspaces of polynomials, we consider the evaluation map
evFmq : Fq[X1, . . . , Xm] → Fq
m
q
P(x1, . . . , xm) 7→ (P(x1, . . . , xm), x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Fmq )
Then, a weighted Reed-Muller code is defined as the image by evFmq of a subspace of poly-
nomials whose weighted degree is bounded by some integer d.
Definition 1.1 (Weighted Reed-Muller code). Let m ≥ 1, ω ∈ (N∗)m and d ∈ N. The
weighted (affine) Reed-Muller code of order m, degree d and weight ω is:
WRMωq (d) = {evFmq (P), P ∈ Fq[X1, . . . , Xm], wdegω(P) ≤ d} .
Note that weighted Reed-Muller codes are generalised Goppa codes on the weighted projec-
tive space P(1,ω1, . . . ,ωm) with evaluation points outside the line at infinity X0 = 0.
The dimension of weighted Reed-Muller codes, as well as bounds on the minimum distance,
are given by Sørensen in his seminal paper [Sør92]. Notice that these parameters are also
analysed in a recent work [ACG+17] by Aubry, Castryck, Ghorpade, Lachaud, O’Sullivan,
and Ram, who also describe minimum weight codewords with geometric techniques. Geil
and Thomsen [GT13] finally proved that weighted Reed-Muller codes are efficiently decod-
able up to half their minimum distance, notably using an embedding of weighted Reed-
Muller codes into Reed-Solomon codes.
1.2 Technical overview and organisation
In this work, we will only focus on the case where m = 2 and ω is of the form ω = (1, η)
where η ≥ 1. This setting seems very restrictive, but it is the most promising in terms of
parameters (see for instance [Sør92, GT13]) and it also finds a practical application in private
information retrieval protocols. For simplicity, we will use the shorter notation WRMηq (d)
for WRM(1,η)q (d).
Our first observation is that, when d ≤ q − 1, the evaluation map evF2q is injective. This
has two major consequences: (i) the code and its parameters are easier to describe and (ii)
puncturing the code on “lines of weighted degree η” leads to highly-sound local correction.
More precisely, in Section 2 we prove the following result.
Theorem 1.2 (informal). Let η ≥ 1, q be a prime power and γ ∈ (0, 1). For a fixed δ ∈ (0, 1) small
enough, the family of weighted Reed-Muller codes WRMηq (bγqc) are (q− 1, δ, ε)-locally correctable,
where ε = Oγ(δ).
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This result is obtained thanks to the following fact. Let φ(T) ∈ Fq[T] be a univariate poly-
nomial of (non-weighted) degree bounded by η, and let L = ((t, φ(t)), t ∈ Fq) ⊂ F2q. Then
for every c = evF2q( f (X, Y)) ∈WRM
η
q (d), the restriction c|L of the vector c to the coordinates
indexed by elements of L is a codeword of a Reed-Solomon code of degree d. Hence, if the
codeword c is corrupted with a constant fraction of errors, picking φ at random and correct-
ing c|L succeeds with constant probability. As a consequence, it allows us to retrieve some
symbols of the corrupted codeword in sublinear query complexity.
However, results described above do not improve the related “local decoding on curves”
technique, described for instance by Yekhanin in his survey [Yek12]. Fortunately, local cor-
rectabilities of weighted Reed-Muller codes can be applied to private information retrieval
protocols in order to resist collusion of servers. In particular, we prove that any weighted
Reed-Muller code WRMηq (d) induces a private information retrieval protocol for databases
of ' q2/2η entries, requiring a minimal computation complexity for the q servers, and re-
maining private against any collusion of η servers. We refer the reader to Section 3 for more
details.
One should notice that the maximal number of entries in the database is directly given
by the dimension of WRMηq (d). Unfortunately, the information rate of such codes remains
bounded by 1/2η as long as d ≤ q− 1, a constraint which is necessary in our context. There-
fore, following the seminal paper of Guo, Kopparty and Sudan [GKS13] and subsequent
works [Guo16, Lav18b], we initiate the study of a weighted lifting of Reed-Solomon codes in
order to produce codes with the same local properties as weighted Reed-Muller codes, but
with a much larger dimension.
Definitions and essential properties of weighted lifted codes are given in Section 4. Similarly to
the constructions of lifted (affine [GKS13] and projective [Lav18b]) Reed-Solomon codes and
lifted Hermitian codes [Guo16], we also prove that for fixed η and q → ∞, weighted lifts of
Reed-Solomon codes are locally correctable with (i) a non-zero asymptotic information rate
in the context of errors with constant relative weight, or (ii) an information rate arbitrary
close to 1 when errors have smaller weight.
These two results are the main technical outcomes of the paper, and we present them in
Section 5. They are obtained after a precise analysis of so-called degree sets of weighted Reed-
Muller and lifted codes, which represent the sets of exponents of monomials spanning the
codes. We finally provide numerical computations of dimensions of weighted lifted codes,
which illustrate the improvement of weighted lifted codes over weighted Reed-Muller codes,
and their practical useability in private information retrieval.
2 Local correction of weighted Reed-Muller codes
2.1 Restricting Reed-Muller codes to weighted lines
The local decoding properties of Reed-Muller codes come from the restriction of their code-
words on a line being Reed-Solomon codewords. Expecting similar properties on weighted
Reed-Muller codes, we have to find what will play the part of the lines in P(1, 1, η).
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Definition 2.1 (η-line on P(1, 1, η)). Let η ≥ 1. We call a (non-vertical) η-line on P(1, 1, η)
the set of zeroes of the polynomial P(X0, X1, X2) = X2 − φ(X0, X1) where φ ∈ Fq[X0, X1] is
homogeneous of degree η.
Since we evaluate polynomials only at points outside the line X0 = 0, we shall define an
η-line on the affine plane A2, viewed as the domain X0 6= 0, as the intersection of an η-line
on P(1, 1, η) and X0 6= 0.
Definition 2.2 (affine η-line). Let η ≥ 1. We call a (non-vertical) η-line onA2 the set of zeroes
of a bivariate polynomial P(X, Y) = Y− φ(X), where φ ∈ Fq[X] and deg φ ≤ η.
Let us remark that if P = Y − φ(X) defines an η-line, then wdegη(P) ≤ η. The converse
is not true, since we removed from the definition collections of “vertical lines” defined by
φ(X) = 0, deg φ ≤ η.
An η-line can be parametrized by t 7→ (t, φ(t)). We thus define
Φη = {Lφ : t 7→ (t, φ(t)) | φ ∈ Fq[T] and deg φ ≤ η} ,
the set of embeddings of η-lines into the affine planeA2 = Fq
2. These embeddings are very
useful when trying to characterise restrictions of weighted Reed-Muller codes to η-lines.
Proposition 2.3. Any polynomial f ∈ Fq[X, Y] whose evaluation overF2q lies in WRMηq (d) satisfies
evFq( f ◦ L) ∈ RSq(d) for any L ∈ Φη .
Proof. It is sufficient to check the result on monomials. Let f = XiY j where i + η j ≤ d. For
every φ ∈ Φη , the univariate polynomial ( f ◦ Lφ)(T) = Tiφ(T)j has degree less than d.
2.2 Local correction
Local decoding was introduced by Katz and Trevisan [KT00] in order to characterise codes al-
lowing to (probabistically) retrieve a message coordinate with a sublinear number of queries
in the code length n. The difficulty comes from the fact that the retrieval must succeed with
non-negligeable probability for every codeword which is corrupted by any possible error
whose weight is bounded by a linear function in n. Local correction is very similar to local
decoding, the only difference being that one requires that any coordinate of the codeword can
be retrieved.
Before giving a formal definition of this notion, let us introduce some notation. We denote
the Hamming distance between two vectors x, y by dH(x, y). The weight of x is wt(x) :=
dH(x, 0). An erasure is a symbol of a word that one knows to be erroneous. Finally, we
denote1 the full-length Reed-Solomon code by
RSq(d) := {evFq( f ), f ∈ Fq[T], deg( f ) ≤ d} ,
and we recall that RSq(d) can correct efficiently 1 erasure and up to b n−d2 c errors.
1take care that this notation (with ≤ d instead of < k) is not the most currently used, but remains very
convenient for our work
4
Definition 2.4 (locally correctable code). Let 1 ≤ ` ≤ k ≤ n, and δ, ε > 0. A code C ⊆ Fnq is
said (`, δ, ε)-locally correctable if there exists a probabilitic algorithm Dec : [1, n] → Fq such
that the following holds. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for every y ∈ Fnq such that dH(y, c) ≤ δn
for some c ∈ C, we have:
– the probability2 that Dec(i) outputs ci is larger than 1− ε;
– Dec(i) reads at most ` coordinates of y.
Similarly to the case of classical Reed-Muller codes and codes derived from those, weighted
Reed-Muller codes can be locally corrected using their restrictions to “lines”. For simplicity,
we see a vector y ∈ Fq2q as a map F2q → Fq, using the bijection between [1, q2] and F2q given
by the evaluation map. Similarly, a ∈ Fqq is seen as a map Fq → Fq. One obtains the local
correction procedure described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: A local correction algorithm Dec for the weighted Reed-Muller code
WRMηq (d).
Input: A coordinate x = (x1, x2) ∈ F2q where to decode, and a oracle access to a word
y : F2q → Fq, where y = c+ e, c ∈ C, and wt(e) ≤ δq2.
Output: The symbol cx, with high probability.
1 Pick at random an η-line L ∈ Φη such that L(t0) = x for some t0 ∈ Fq.
2 Define S = L(Fq) and z = y|S : Fq 7→ Fq.
3 Consider zt0 as an erasure, and decode z in the Reed-Solomon code RSq(d + 1), giving
a corrected codeword z˜.
4 Output the corrected value z˜t0 .
According to Katz and Trevisan’s terminology [KT00], Algorithm 1 is not perfectly smooth,
in the sense that the coordinate yx is never queried. nevertheless, it can be made smooth
following techniques described in [Lav18a, Chapter 2].
Theorem 2.5. Let η ≥ 1, q be a prime power, and γ ∈ (0, 1) such that q− bγqc is even. For every
δ ≤ 1−γ4 , the weighted Reed-Muller code WRMηq (bγqc) is (q − 1, δ, ε)-locally correctable where
ε ≤ 21−γδ.
Proof. Let y = c+ e : F2q → Fq be a corrupted codeword, where c ∈ WRMηq (d) and wt(e) ≤
δq2. We define E = {x ∈ F2q | ex 6= 0} the support of e. The random variable representing the
set of queries addressed by the local decoder is denoted by Ax. It is clear that the algorithm
succeeds if |Ax ∩ E| ≤ w, where w = q−bγqc2 − 1, since a Reed-Solomon of dimension bγqc+ 1
can decode up to 1 erasure and w errors. Using Markov’s inequality, the probability p of
success of Algorithm 1 satisfies:
p ≥ 1−P(|Ax ∩ E| ≥ w + 1) ≥ 1− E(|Ax ∩ E|)w + 1 .
2taken over the internal randomness of the decoder Dec
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Moreover, for every a ∈ F2q, we have P(a ∈ Ax) ≤ q−1q2−1 . Hence,
E(|Ax ∩ E|) = ∑
a∈E
P(a ∈ Ax) ≤ δq2 · q− 1q2 − 1 ≤ δq .
Finally we get
p ≥ 1− 4δq
q− bγqc ≥ 1−
2δ
1− γ .
Remark 2.6. If η ≥ 2, it is possible to get a sharper bound for the probability p of success of
Algorithm 1. Using Chebyshev’s inequality (quite similarly to [Lav18a, Proposition 2.36]),
one can indeed prove that p ≥ 1−O( δ(1−δ)q ).
3 Application to private information retrieval
Private information retrieval (PIR) protocols are cryptographic protocols ensuring that a user
can retrieve an entry Di of a remote database D = (D1, . . . , Dk), without revealing any infor-
mation on the index i ∈ [1, k] to the holder of the database. Additionally, it is also required
that the communication cost (number of bits exchanged during the retrieval process) is sub-
linear in the size of the database.
Since its introduction by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan in 1995 [CGKS95], various
kinds of PIR schemes have been designed according to the system constraints. In earliest
PIR schemes, one assumes that the database is replicated over ` non-communicating honest-
but-curious servers S1, . . . , S`. In this context the seminal result of Katz and Trevisan [KT00]
— which relates PIR protocols to the existence of so-called smooth locally decodable codes —
induced many new constructions of PIR schemes, notably in [BIKR02, Yek08, Efr12, DG16].
These constructions eventually achieved O(exp(
√
log k log log k)) bits of communication for
a k-entry database replicated on ` = 2 servers.
Motivated by the use of storage codes in distributed storage systems, a large amount of re-
cent works focused on the case where the database is encoded on the servers. In this context,
entries of the database are usually very large (e.g. movies), so that we can assume that the
download communication cost prevails over the upload one. Several works aimed at minimiz-
ing this cost depending on the storage system: Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran [SRR14] con-
sidered the replication code as the storage code; Tajeddine, Gnilke and El Rouayheb [TGR18]
MDS codes; Kumar, Rosnes and Graell i Amat [KRGiA17] arbitrary codes.
It is worth noticing that, following e.g. Beimel and Stahl [BS02], a few works also considered
the more restrictive setting of colluding servers (i.e. servers communicating with each other
so as to collect information about the required item), byzantine servers (i.e. servers able to
produce wrong answers to user’s queries) or unresponsive servers (servers unable to give
ananswer to user’s queries).
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Finally, one should emphasise that families of PIR schemes referenced above mostly focus
on decreasing the communication cost during the retrieval process. This is done at the ex-
pense of other crucial parameters, such as the computation complexity of the recovery, or the
servers’ storage overhead.
In this section, we show how the local properties of weighted Reed-Muller codes WRMηq (d)
lead to very natural PIR protocols resisting to any set of b byzantine, u unresponsive and t
colluding servers — provided that 2b + u + t ≤ q− d− 1 — with moderate communication
complexity but optimal computation complexity.
3.1 Definitions
Definition 3.1 (private information retrieval). Let D ∈ Fkq be a remote database distributed
on ` servers S1, . . . , S`, in such a way3 that we assume that each server Sj stores a vec-
tor c(j) ∈ Fmq . A private information retrieval (PIR) protocol for D is a tuple of algorithms
(Query,Answer,Recover) such that:
1. Query is a probabilistic algorithm taking as input a coordinate i ∈ [1, k], and providing
a random tuple of queries Query(i) = (q1, . . . , q`) ∈ Q` for some finite set Q;
2. Answer is a deterministic algorithm taking as input a server index j ∈ [1, `], a query
qj ∈ Q and the vector c(j) stored by server Sj, and outputs an answer aj ∈ A, where A
is a finite set;
3. Recover is a deterministic algorithm taking as input a coordinate i ∈ [1, k], a tuple of
queries q = (q1, . . . , q`) ∈ Q` and a tuple of answers a = (a1, . . . , a`) ∈ A`, and which
outputs a symbol r ∈ Fq satisfying the following requirement. If q = Query(i) and
a = (Answer(j, qj, c(j)))1≤j≤`, then:
Di = Recover(i, q, a) . (1)
We also say that a PIR protocol
– is t-private (or resists to any collusion of t servers) if for every T ⊂ [1, `], |T| = t, we
have
I(Query(i)|T ; i) = 0,
where I(· ; ·) denotes the mutual information between random variables;
– is robust against b byzantine and u unresponsive servers if (1) holds when up to b symbols
of a = (Answer(j, qj, c(j)))1≤j≤` ∈ A` differ from the expected ones, and up to u symbols
of a are missing.
Let us now define some of the most studied parameters of PIR protocols.
Definition 3.2. Let (Query,Answer,Recover) be a PIR protocol. We define:
– its communication complexity as Ccomm := `(log(|Q|) + log(|A|));
3Notice that we make no other assumption on the way (replication, encoding, etc.) the database is stored on
the servers. We only require that the encoding map D 7→ (c(1), . . . , c(`)) is injective.
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– its server computation complexity, denoted Cscomp as the maximal number of operations
over Fq necessary to compute Answer(j, qj, c(j));
– its storage rate as the ratio k`m .
We finally say that a PIR protocol is computationally optimal for the servers if Cscomp ≤ 1.
3.2 The PIR protocol
We present in this section a PIR protocol based on weighted Reed-Muller codes. The protocol
relies on a well-suited splitting of the encoded database over the servers, as it was originally
done by Augot, Levy-dit-Vehel and Shikfa in [ALS14]
Protocol 3.3. Let C = WRMηq (d), and denote its dimension by k. Recall that a codeword
c ∈ C can be seen as a map F2q → Fq. Let us also consider q servers (St)t∈Fq indexed by
elements of Fq.
Initialisation. The database D ∈ Fkq is encoded into a codeword c ∈ C. For every t ∈ Fq,
the server St receives the part c|{t}×Fq of the codeword c. Notice that c|{t}×Fq consists in q
symbols over Fq.
Queries. Assume one wants to retrieve Di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. One can always assume that the
encoding map is systematic, hence Di = cx for some x = (x1, x2) ∈ F2q. To define a vector of
queries:
– Pick at random an η-line L ∈ Φη such that L(t0) = x for some t0 ∈ Fq.
– The server St0 receives a random element yt0 ∈ Fq.
– Server St, t 6= t0 receives yt ∈ Fq such that (t, yt) = L(t).
Answers. Upon receipt of yt ∈ Fq, every server St reads the entry c(t,yt) ∈ Fq and sends it
back to the user.
Recovery. The user collects c′ = (c(t,yt))t∈Fq and runs an error-and-erasure correcting algo-
rithm for RSq(d) with input c′. Then, the user returns the corrected symbol c′(t0,yt0 )
.
Theorem 3.4. Let q be a prime power, η ≥ 1 , and b, u ≥ 0. Set d = q − u − 2b − 2. Then,
Protocol 3.3 equipped with WRMηq (d) is η-private and robust against b byzantine and u unresponsive
servers. Moreover, it is computationally optimal for the servers, its storage rate approaches 1/2η when
q→ ∞, and its communication complexity is 2q log q.
Proof. The correctness of the PIR scheme, under b byzantine and u unresponsive servers,
comes from Proposition 2.3 and from the fact that RSq(d) corrects b errors and u+ 1 erasures
if d ≥ q− u− 2b− 2. Moreover, the scheme is η-private since any subset of η points of an
η-line gives no information about the other points. Finally, the parameters of the scheme can
be easily checked.
8
xq points
l
coordinates known
by each server
q lines↔ servers
Figure 1: Illustration of the retrieval process. For a desired coordinate cx, an η-line L (in red)
containing x is picked at random.
4 Towards higher information rate: the lifting process
4.1 Definitions
In previous sections, we have proved that weighted Reed-Muller codes admit local proper-
ties that can be used in practical applications such as private information retrieval. However,
such constuctions are moderately efficient in terms of storage, since the information rate of
WRMηq (d) is bounded by 1/2η if d ≤ q− 2.
In this section, we show how to construct codes with the same local properties as weighted
Reed-Muller codes, but admitting a much larger dimension. As a practical consequence,
these new codes can replace weighted Reed-Muller codes in Protocol 3.3, leading to storage-
efficient PIR schemes.
Techniques involved in the construction of these codes directly follow the lifting process ini-
tiated by Guo, Kopparty and Sudan [GKS13]. More precisely, the authors introduce so-called
lifted Reed-Solomon codes as codes containing (classical) Reed-Muller codes, and satisfying that
the restriction of any codeword to any affine line lies in a Reed-Solomon. The purpose of this
section is to extend this notion to η-lines.
We thus naturally introduce the η-lifting of a Reed-Solomon code as follows.
Definition 4.1 (η-lifting of a Reed-Solomon code). Let q be a prime power and 0 ≤ d ≤ q− 1.
The η-lifting of the Reed-Solomon code RSq(d) is the code of length n = q2 defined as follows:
Liftη(RSq(d)) := {evF2q( f ) | f ∈ Fq[X, Y], ∀L ∈ Φη , evFq( f ◦ L) ∈ RSq(d)} .
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Notice that if d = q− 1, the η-lifted code Liftη(RSq(q− 1)) is the trivial full space Fq
2
q . Hence,
from now on we assume d ≤ q− 2.
It is clear that WRMηq (d) ⊆ Liftη(RSq(d)) since the constraints that define η-lifted codes are
satisfied by each codeword of a comparable weighted Reed-Muller code. But quite surpris-
ingly, the code Liftη(RSq(d)) is sometimes much larger than WRM
η
q (d). Let us highlight this
claim with an example.
Example 4.2. Let q = 4, η = 2 and d = 2. The associated weighted Reed-Muller code is
generated by the evaluation vectors of monomials XiY j, where (i, j) lies in
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (2, 0)} .
Let us now consider the monomial f (X, Y) = Y2 ∈ F4[X, Y] and an η-line L(T) = (T, aT2 +
bT + c) ∈ Φ2, where a, b, c ∈ F4. We see that for every t ∈ F4, we have:
( f ◦ L)(t) = (at2 + bt + c)2 = a2t4 + b2t2 + c2 = b2t2 + a2t + c .
Hence, evF4( f ◦ L) ∈ RS4(2) for every L ∈ Φ2. Since wdegη( f ) = 4 > 2, we get
evF24( f ) ∈ Lift
2(RS4(2)) \WRM24(2) .
Given a polynomial f (X, Y) = ∑i,j fi,jXiY j ∈ Fq[X, Y], we define its degree set as
Deg( f ) := {(i, j) ∈N2, fi,j 6= 0} .
By extension, the degree set Deg(S) of a subset S ⊆ Fq[X, Y] is the union of degree sets of
polynomials lying in S. Similarly, if C = {evF2q( f ), f ∈ S}, then we set Deg(C) := Deg(S).
Remark 4.3. Since aq = a for every a ∈ Fq, one can consider degree sets as subsets of
[0, q − 1]2. This precisely corresponds to considering polynomials modulo the ideal I =
〈Xq − X, Yq −Y〉 = ker evF2q .
Lemma 4.4. Let f ∈ Fq[X, Y] such that Deg( f ) ⊆ [0, q− 1]2, and let (i, j) ∈ Deg( f ). Assume
that for every (a, b) ∈ Deg( f ), we have i ≥ a (respectively, j ≥ b). Then, there exists an η-line
L ∈ Φη such that deg( f ◦ L) = i (respectively, deg( f ◦ L) = j).
Proof. If i ≥ a for every (a, b) ∈ Deg( f ), then L(T) = (T, 1) lies in Φη , and the degree of f ◦ L
is thus i. The proof is similar for j.
Proposition 4.5. Let d ≤ q− 2. Then,
Deg(Liftη(RSq(d))) ⊆ [0, d]2 .
Proof. A pair (i, j) ∈ Deg(Liftη(RSq(d))) \ [0, d]2 would contradict Lemma 4.4.
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4.2 Monomiality
We say that a linear code C is monomial if there exists a set S ⊂ Fq[X, Y] of monomials, such
that C = Span{evF2q( f ), f ∈ S}. Monomial codes are convenient since they admit a simple
description.
Let us define monomial transformations ma,b : (x, y) 7→ (ax, by), for (a, b) ∈ (F×q )2.
Lemma 4.6. Let S be a subspace of Fq[X, Y] such that:
(i) Deg(S) ⊆ [0, q− 2]2, and
(ii) for every f (X, Y) ∈ S and every (a, b) ∈ (F×q )2, the polynomial f ◦ma,b also lies in S.
Then S is spanned by monomials.
Proof. Let f (X, Y) = ∑(i,j)∈D fi,jXiY j ∈ S where D = Deg( f ) ⊆ [0, q− 2]2. It is sufficient to
prove that for all (i, j) ∈ D, the monomial XiY j lies in S.
For (i, j) ∈ D, let us define
Qi,j(X, Y) := ∑
(a,b)∈(F×q )2
1
aibj
f (aX, bY) .
Since S is a vector space invariant under {ma,b | (a, b) ∈ (F×q )2}, we have Qi,j ∈ S. Moreover,
Qi,j(X, Y) = ∑
(a,b)∈(F×q )2
1
aibj
 ∑
(d,e)∈Deg( f )
fd,e adbeXdYe

= ∑
(d,e)∈Deg( f )
fd,e ∑
(a,b)∈(F×q )2
ad−ibe−jXdYe
= ∑
(d,e)∈Deg( f )
fd,e ·
(
∑
a∈F×q
ad−i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 if d=i,−1 otherwise
·
(
∑
b∈F×q
be−j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 if e=j,−1 otherwise
· XdYe
= fi,j · (−1)2 · XiY j .
Since fi,j 6= 0, XiY j ∈ S.
Proposition 4.7. Let d ≤ q− 1. The linear code Liftη(RSq(d)) is monomial.
Proof. The code Liftη(RSq(q− 1)) is the full space Fq
2
q ; hence it is trivially a monomial code.
For d ≤ q− 2, let us define
S := { f ∈ Fq[X, Y], Deg( f ) ⊆ [0, q− 1]2, evF2q( f ) ∈ Liftη(RSq(d))} .
Proposition 4.5 ensures that Deg(S) ⊆ [0, d]2. Let f = ∑i,j fi,jXiY j ∈ S. For every (a, b) ∈
(F×q )2 and every L(T) = (T, φ(T)) ∈ Φη we have
f ◦ma,b ◦ L(T) =∑
i,j
fi,jaiTibjφ(T)j .
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Let us now define Q(T) := f (T, bφ(a−1T)). One can easily check that (T, bφ(a−1T))) ∈ Φη .
Since evF2q( f ) ∈ Liftη(RSq(d)), we also know that evFq(Q) ∈ RSq(d). Moreover, RSq(d) is
invariant under affine transformations, hence evFq(Q(aT)) ∈ RSq(d). Let us now remark
that
Q(aT) =∑
i,j
fi,jaiTibjφ(T)j = f ◦ma,b ◦ L(T) .
Consequently, f ◦ma,b ∈ S. Therefore we can use Lemma 4.6, and our result follows imme-
diately.
4.3 The degree set of η-lifted Reed-Solomon codes
Previous discussions ensure that, given a tuple (η, d, q), the code C(q, d, η) := Liftη(RSq(d))
is fully determined by its degree set D(q, d, η) := Deg(C(q, d, η)) ⊆ [0, d]2. Let us now seek
for characterisations of D(q, d, η).
For this purpose, we need to introduce some notation:
– 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product between vectors, or tuples.
– We set w := (1, 2, . . . , η) ∈Nη .
– Given α ∈N and a prime number p, we denote by α(r) the rth digit in the representation
of α in base p, i.e. α = ∑r≥0 α(r)pr.
– For α, β ∈N, we write α ≤p β if and only if α(r) ≤ β(r) for every r ≥ 0.
– For k ∈Nη and r ∈N, we also write k(r) = (k(r)1 , . . . , k(r)η ) ∈Nη .
We will also make use of Lucas theorem [Luc78] which gives the reduction of binomial coef-
ficients modulo primes.
Theorem 4.8 (Lucas theorem [Luc78]). Let a, b ∈ N and p be a prime number. Recall that
a = ∑i≥0 a(i)pi is the representation of a in base p. Then,(
a
b
)
=∏
i≥0
(
a(i)
b(i)
)
mod p .
In particular, in any field of characteristic p, the binomial coefficient (ab) is non-zero if and
only if b ≤p a.
In the next lemma, we characterise univariate polynomials arising from the restriction of Y j
to η-lines.
Lemma 4.9. Let j ≥ 0 and η ≥ 1 and let us define Φjη := {φ(T)j | φ(T) ∈ Fq[T], deg φ ≤ η} ⊆
Fq[T]. We have:
Φjη = Span{Tα | α ∈ ∆(j, η)} ,
where
∆(j, η) :=
{
〈w, k〉 | k ∈Nη such that ∀m ≤ η, km ≤p j−
m−1
∑
`=1
k`
}
.
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Proof. Given a polynomial φ(T) = ∑ηm=0 amT
m ∈ Fq[T], the well-known multinomial theo-
rem entails that:
φ(T)j = (a0 + a1T + · · ·+ aηTη)j
= ∑
k1+···+kη≤j
(
j
k1, . . . , kη
)
λkxk1+2k2+···+ηkη ,
where λk := a
j−|k|
0 ×∏η`=1 ak`` ∈ Fq is a coefficient which only depends on a0, . . . , aη and k,
and where (
j
k
)
:=
(
j
k1, . . . , kη
)
=
j!
k1!k2! . . . kη !(j−∑ηm=1 km)!
.
The coefficient of the term Tα in φ(T)j is therefore:
cα = ∑
k∈Kα
(
j
k
)
λk ,
where Kα := {k ∈ Nη | |k| ≤ j and 〈w, k〉 = α}. We claim that cα = 0 for every φ ∈ Φη if
and only if ( jk) = 0 for every k ∈ Kα. Indeed, cα ∈ Fq can be seen as the evaluation of an
homogeneous polynomial Cα ∈ Fq[A0, . . . , Aη ] of degree j at the point (a0, . . . , aη) ∈ Fη+1q
corresponding to φ. Since j ≤ q− 1, the polynomial Cα vanishes over Fη+1q if and only if it is
the zero polynomial, which proves our claim.
Now, notice that(
j
k
)
=
(
j
k1
)(
j− k1
k2
)(
j− k1 − k2
k3
)
· · ·
(
j− k1 − k2 − · · · − kη−1
kη
)
.
Hence, using Lucas theorem [Luc78] on every binomial coefficient in the above product, we
see that ( jk) = 0 if and only if there exists m ∈ [1, η] such that km 6≤p j−∑m−1`=1 k`.
In other words, the monomial Tα appears as a term of φ(T)j if and only if there exists k ∈Nη
such that α = 〈w, k〉 = ∑η`=1 `k` and
∀m ∈ [1, η], km ≤p j−
m−1
∑
`=1
k` .
Let us now give some properties on the set ∆(j, η) ⊆N defined in Lemma 4.9.
Lemma 4.10. We have ∆(j, η) ⊆ [0, jη]. Moreover, an integer α belongs to ∆(j, η) if and only if
∃k ∈Nη such that α = 〈w, k〉 and ∀r ≥ 0,
m
∑
`=1
k(r) ≤ j(r). (2)
Proof. By definition, an integer α belongs to ∆(j, η) if and only if there exists k ∈ Nη such
that α = ∑
η
`=1 `k` and for all m ≤ η, we have
km ≤p j−
m−1
∑
`=1
k` . (3)
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We first prove by induction on m that, if α ∈ ∆(j, η), then for all m ≤ η and for all r ≥ 0,
m
∑
`=1
k(r)` ≤ j(r) .
Notice that it would prove the desired result for m = η. Moreover, the case m = 1 is a direct
consequence of (3).
Let us fix 2 ≤ m ≤ η such that ∑m−1`=1 k(r)` ≤ j(r) for every r ≥ 0. Then ∑m−1`=1 k(r)` ≤ p− 1 and
the uniqueness of the representation of the integer ∑m−1`=1 k` in base p ensures that(
m−1
∑
`=1
k`
)(r)
=
m−1
∑
`=1
k(r)` ≤ j(r). (4)
Using (3), we get k(r)m ≤ j(r) −∑m−1`=1 k(r)` , which implies that ∑m`=1 k(r)` ≤ j(r).
Conversely, assume that (2) holds, and let 1 ≤ m ≤ η. We shall prove that (3) is satisfied. For
every r ≥ 0, we have
k(r)m ≤
η
∑
`=m
k(r)` =
η
∑
`=1
k(r)` −
m−1
∑
`=1
k(r)` .
Equation (2) implies that k(r)m ≤ j(r)−∑m−1`=1 k(r)` . Moreover, ∑m−1`=1 k(r)` ≤ j(r), hence as we have
seen in (4), (
m−1
∑
`=1
k`
)(r)
=
m−1
∑
`=1
k(r)` .
This leads us to k(r)m ≤
(
j−∑m−1`=1 k`
)(r)
. Therefore, km ≤p j−∑m−1`=1 k`.
As an easy corollary of Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10, we see that
Deg({(XiY j) ◦ φ, φ ∈ Φη}) = {i + u, u ∈ ∆(j, η)} .
Hence, evF2q(X
iY j) lies in Liftη RSq(d) if, for all u ∈ ∆(j, η), every monomial Ti+u evaluates
to a codeword of RSq(d). Notice here that i + u might be larger than q, therefore this is
equivalent to say that Ti+u mod (Tq − T) is polynomial of degree bounded by d.
This remark leads us to introduce a relation of equivalence between integers. We write a ≡?q
b if and only if Ta = Tb mod (Tq − T). In other words, a ≡?q b if and only if (a, b) = (0, 0),
or a > 0, b > 0 and (q − 1) | (a − b). Finally, we denote4 by Red?q(a) the only integer in
[0, q− 1] such that Red?q(a) ≡?q a.
From Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10, and following the previous discussion, we deduce a char-
acterisation of elements of D(q, d, η).
Proposition 4.11. Let d ≤ q− 2. A pair (i, j) ∈ [0, d]2 belongs to D(q, d, η) if and only if for every
k ∈Nη such that for all r ≥ 0, |k(r)| ≤ j(r), we have
Red?q(i + 〈w, k〉) ≤ d.
4notation mod ∗q is used in [GKS13], but we find it quite unconvenient
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5 Analyses of sequences of degree sets
For a generic tuple (η, q, d), it seems difficult to give an explicit description of the degree set
of Liftη RSq(d). Our approach is to analyse sequences of degree sets D(q, d, η) with varying
parameters q = pe, d, and η, in order to produce good asymptotic families of codes.
We will illustrate our analyses with graphical representations of degree sets. Our convention
is the following. Assume one wants to represent a degree set D ⊆ [q− 1]2. If (i, j) ∈ D, then
a black (or sometimes grey) unit square is represented at coordinate (i, j); otherwise, a white
unit square is plotted. Such an illustration is proposed in Example 5.1.
Example 5.1. The degree set D of Lift2(RS8(5)), namely
D = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0), (5, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 0), (2, 1), (4, 0), (4, 1), (4, 4)}
is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A representation of the degree set D of Lift2 RS8(5).
Let us now provide generic relations between η-lifted codes of varying parameters.
5.1 Increasing and decreasing sequences of η-lifted codes
5.1.1 Sequence (D(q, d, η))η≥1, with (q, d) fixed and varying η
Lemma 5.2. Let us fix a prime power q and d ≤ q− 1. The sequence of codes (Liftη RSq(d))η≥1 is
decreasing with respect to the inclusion of codes.
Proof. It is enough to notice that an η-line is also an (η + 1)-line, therefore every codeword
of Liftη+1 RSq(d) fulfills the constraints defining Liftη RSq(d).
In Figure 3, we plot a sequence of degree sets which illustrates this result on F16.
5.1.2 Sequence (D(q, d, η))0≤d≤q−2 with (q, η) fixed and varying d
Lemma 5.3. Let us fix a prime power q and η ≥ 1. The sequence (Liftη RSq(d))d≥0 is increasing.
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(a) η = 1 (b) η = 2 (c) η = 3
(d) η = 4 (e) η = 5 (f) η = 6
Figure 3: Representation of the degree set of Liftη RS16(14) for different values of η
Proof. It is a straightforward consequence of the embedding of RSq(d) into RSq(d + 1).
In Figure 4, we plot a sequence of degree sets which illutrates this result on F16 with η = 2.
5.1.3 Sequence (D(q, q− α, η))q with fixed (α, η), and varying q
Let us fix a prime number p, and let us consider a sequence of degree sets (D(pe, pe −
α, η))e≥1 with fixed (α, η), and varying e. Figure 5 represents such a sequence. In this figure,
one can notice that D(pe, pe − α, η) is a subpattern (highlighted in grey) of the larger degree
sets D(pe+1, pe+1 − α, η).
This remark seems trivial at first, but it has a meaningful consequence in terms of codes.
Indeed, it shows that the corresponding η-lifted codes are (up to isomophism) subcodes to
each other when the field size q = pe grows. This property is formalized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Let η < q = pe and 2 ≤ α ≤ pe. If (pe − i, j) ∈ D(pe, pe − α, η), then
(pe+1 − i, j) ∈ D(pe+1, pe+1 − α, η) .
Proof. Let (pe − i, j) ∈ D(pe, pe − α, η), and consider k ∈ N such that |k(r)| ≤ j(r) for every
r ≥ 0. Using Proposition 4.11, we know that Red?pe((pe − i) + 〈w, k〉) ≤ pe − α, and we want
to prove that Red?pe+1(p
e+1 − i) ≤ pe+1 − α.
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(a) d = 8 (b) d = 9 (c) d = 10
(d) d = 11 (e) d = 12 (f) d = 13
Figure 4: Representation of the degree set of Lift2 RS16(d) for different values of d
Notice that there exists (Q0, Q1, R) ∈N3 satisfying:
(pe − i) + 〈w, k〉 = (Q1 p + Q0)(pe − 1) + R
with Q0 ≤ p− 1 and R ≤ pe − α. Since 〈w, k〉 ≤ η|k| ≤ η j ≤ η(pe − 1), one can also check
that Q1 p + Q0 ≤ η + 1.
The case R = 0 must be handled at first. Notice that this implies that (pe − i) + 〈w, k〉 = 0,
meaning that (pe− i, j) = (0, 0). Then one can check that (pe+1− pe, 0) ∈ D(pe+1, pe+1− α, η)
since α ≤ pe. Hence, from now on, we assume that R ≥ 1, and we distinguish two cases.
First, assume that Q0 ≥ 1. Then we have
pe+1 − i + 〈w, k〉 = pe+1 − pe + (Q1 p + Q0)(pe − 1) + R = (Q1 + 1)(pe+1 − 1) + R′
where
R′ := Q0(pe − 1) + R− (Q1 + 1)(p− 1) .
We see that pe+1 − i + 〈w, k〉 ≡?pe+1 R′, hence it is sufficient to prove that 1 ≤ R′ ≤ pe+1 − α.
Using R ≤ pe − α and Q0 ≤ p− 1, we get R′ ≤ pe+1 − α. Now, notice that Q1 ≤ η+1−Q0p ≤
b pe−1p c = pe−1 − 1. Hence,
R′ ≥ R + pe − 1− (p− 1)pe−1 ≥ R + pe−1 − 1 ≥ 1 .
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(a) e = 4 (b) e = 5 (c) e = 6
Figure 5: Representation of the degree set of Lift3 RS2e(2e − 4) for increasing values of e. In
the degree set over F2e , the grey part is an exact copy of the degree set over F2e−1 which is
represented on its left.
Now, assume that Q0 = 0. We thus have
pe+1 − i + 〈w, k〉 = Q1(pe+1 − 1) + R′
where
R′ := pe+1 − pe + R−Q1(p− 1).
Once again, let us prove that 1 ≤ R′ ≤ pe+1 − α. It is straightforward to check that R′ ≤
pe+1 − α. Moreover, Q1 ≤ η+1p ≤ pe−1, leading to
R′ ≥ pe+1 − pe + R− pe−1(p− 1) ≥ R ≥ 1 .
5.2 On the asymptotic information rate of Liftη(RSq(d)) when q→ ∞
In this section, we consider sequences of codes Liftη RSq(d) where q ≥ 2 varies exponentially
(i.e. q = pe with increasing e), and where we see d as a function of q such that d(q) ≤ q− 2.
Recall that q represents simultaneously the size of the finite field and the square root of the
code length. Throughout the section, we will write q = pe.
To our opinion, two cases are of interest: d = q − α where α ≥ 2 is a fixed integer, and
d = bγqc where γ ∈ (0, 1). In the first case (d = q − α) we prove that we obtain η-lifted
codes whose information rate grows to 1 when q → ∞. In the second case (d = bγqc) we
prove that the sequence of η-lifted codes admits an asymptotic information rate Rγ > 0 when
q→ ∞, meaning that this sequence of codes is asymptotically good and is locally correctable
from a constant fraction of errors. In order to prove these results, we look for tight enough
lower bounds on the dimension of η-lifted codes.
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5.2.1 A lower bound for |D(q, q− α, η)|.
We first highlight that, for a fixed α ≥ 2, the degree set D(q, q − α, η) of Liftη RSq(q − α)
contains many copies of the degree set of WRMηpε(p
ε − α− η), for ε ≤ e. In terms of codes, it
informally means that weighted Reed-Muller codes defined over several fields Fpε for ε ≤ e,
can be embedded in many different manners into η-lifted codes. This is formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5.5. Let 0 ≤ ε ≤ e, α ∈ [0, pε − 1] and (i, j) ∈ Deg(WRMηpε(pε − α− η)). Then, for
every 0 ≤ a, b ≤ pe−ε − 1, we have
(i + apε, j + bpε) ∈ D(pe, pe − α, η) .
Proof. Assume that (i, j) ∈ Deg(WRMηpε(pε − α− η)). Then i + η j ≤ pε − α− η. We use the
characterisation of Proposition 4.11 to prove our result.
Take k ∈Nη such that for all r ≥ 0, ∑η`=1 k(r)` ≤ (j + bpε)(r). Then
η
∑
`=1
k(r)` ≤

j(r) if r ∈ [0, ε− 1],
b(r−ε) if r ∈ [ε, e− 1],
0 if r ≥ e.
Our purpose is to bound Red?pe(i + apε + 〈w, k〉). We see that
i + apε + 〈w, k〉 = i + apε +
η
∑
`=1
`
(
ε−1
∑
r=0
k(r)` p
r +
e−1
∑
r=ε
k(r)` p
r
)
= R1 + pεR2
where R1 := i +∑
η
`=0 `∑
ε−1
r=0 k
(r)
` p
r and R2 := a +∑
η
`=0 `∑
e−1
r=ε k
(r)
` p
r−ε.
One can check that R1 ≤ i + η j ≤ pε − α − η. It remains to deal with R2. Let us write
R2 = ∑e−ε−1r=0 R
(r)
2 p
r + R′2 pe−ε with R′2 ≤ η. Then
pεR2 = (pe − 1)R′2 + R′2 +
e−ε−1
∑
r=0
R(r)2 p
ε+r ≡?pe R′2 +
e−1
∑
r=ε
R(r)2 p
r .
Therefore,
i + apε + 〈w, k〉 ≡?pe R1 + R′2 +
ε−1
∑
r=0
R(r)2 p
ε+r ≤ pε − α− η + η + pε(pe−ε − 1) ≤ pe − α,
which proves that (i + apε, j + bpε) belongs to D(pe, pe − α, η).
Notice that WRMηpε(p
ε − α− η) = {0} if α ≥ pε. Therefore let us set eα = blogp αc and define
W(ε, a, b) :=
{
(i + apε, j + bpε) | (i, j) ∈ Deg WRMηpε(pε − α− η)
}
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as the degree set of weighted Reed-Muller codes over Fpe , translated by (apε, bpε). Proposi-
tion 5.5 ensures that:
D(pe, pe − α, η) ⊃
e⋃
ε=eα+1
⋃
0≤a,b<pe−ε
W(ε, a, b). (5)
Equation (5) helps us to obtain a first lower bound on the dimension of lifted codes. It is clear
that W(ε, a, b) ∩W(ε, a′, b′) = ∅ if (a′, b′) 6= (a, b). Unfortunately, the union given in (5) is
not disjoint, as illustrated in Figure 6. The main reason is that W(ε, a, b) contains a certain
number of degree sets of the formW(ε′, a′, b′), for ε′ < ε. We compute this precise number
in Lemma 5.6.
Figure 6: Embedding ofW(ε, a, b) ⊂ D(35, 35 − 3, 2) with ε ≤ 5.
For m ≥ 0, we set
Tm(p, η) = Tm :=
(⌊
pm − 1
η
⌋
+ 1
)(
pm − η
2
⌊
pm − 1
η
⌋)
. (6)
One can check that Tm is a positive integer which counts the number of pairs of non-negative
integers (u, v) such that u + ηv ≤ pm − 1.
Lemma 5.6. Fix eα + 1 ≤ ε1 ≤ ε2 ≤ e. Then, for all 0 ≤ a2, b2 < pe−ε2 , we have:∣∣{(a1, b1) | W(ε1, a1, b1) ⊂ W(ε2, a2, b2)}∣∣ = Tε2−ε1 .
Proof. We first notice thatW(ε1, a1, b1) ⊆ W(ε2, a2, b2) if and only if
W(ε1, a1 − a2 pε2−ε1 , b1 − b2 pε2−ε1) ⊆ W(ε2, 0, 0) .
Moreover, for u, v ≥ 0, we see thatW(ε1, u, v) ⊆ W(ε2, 0, 0) if and only if for every i, j ≥ 0,
we have
i + η j ≤ pε1 − α− η =⇒ i + upε1 + η(j + vpε1) ≤ pε2 − α− η ,
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which is equivalent to (u + ηv)pε1 ≤ pε2 − pε1 . It remains to notice that Tε2−ε1 counts the
number of non-negative integers u, v such that
u + ηv ≤
⌊
pε2 − pε1
pε1
⌋
= pε2−ε1 − 1 .
For any m ∈N, we set
Wm(α) := |Deg WRMηpm(pm − α− η)| = |W(m, 0, 0)|
=
⌊
pm − α
η
⌋(
pm − α+ 1− η
2
(⌊
pm − α
η
+ 1
⌋))
.
(7)
Let us also define N0 := 1, and
Nm := p2m −
m−1
∑
ν=0
NνTm−ν (8)
as the number of trianglesW(e−m, a, b) that are not included in anyW(e−m′, a′, b′) with
m′ ≤ m. Notice that, equivalently, we have
p2m =
m
∑
ν=0
NνTm−ν . (9)
Example 5.7. As displayed in Figure 6, for p = 3 and η = 2, the first terms of the sequence
(Nm) are 1, 5, 36, 264.
The following theorem can be proven by a simple counting argument.
Theorem 5.8. Fix α ≥ 2, η ≥ 1 and a prime power q = pe. Let (Wm(α))m≤e and (Nm)m≤e be the
sequences defined above. Then, the dimension |D(q, q− α, η)| of Liftη RSq(q− α) is lower bounded
by
e−eα−1
∑
ε=0
We−ε(α)Nε ,
where eα = blogp αc.
5.2.2 Asymptotical behaviour of the sequences (Tm), (Wm(α)) and (Nm)
Let us sum up the asymptotics of the sequences introduced in the previous paragraph.
Lemma 5.9. When m→ +∞,
1. Tm ∼ p
2m
2η ,
2. Wm(α) ∼ Tm for any α ≥ 2.
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The following technical lemma will be useful in the proof of Theorem 5.11.
Lemma 5.10. Let (Nm) be the sequence defined in (8). Then
lim
m→+∞
1
p2m
m
∑
`=0
N` = 0.
Proof. Let us first prove that the series ∑`≥0
N`
p2` is convergent. Fix δ > 0.
By Lemma 5.9, Tm ∼ p
2m
2η . Hence there exists L ∈N such that for any ` ≥ L, p2` ≤ (2η+ δ)T`.
Therefore, using (8), we get
m
∑
`=0
N`
p2`
=
m−L
∑
`=0
N`
p2`
+
m
∑
`=m−L+1
N`
p2`
≤ 1
p2m
m−L
∑
`=0
N`p2(m−`) +
m
∑
`=m−L+1
N`
p2`
≤ (2η + δ)
p2m
m−L
∑
`=0
N`Tm−` +
m
∑
`=m−L+1
N`
p2`
,
since m− ` ≥ L ⇐⇒ ` ≤ m− L.
Notice that all the terms of the first sum are non-negative. Hence by (9), we have∑m−L`=0 N`Tm−` ≤
p2m, leading to
m
∑
`=0
N`
p2`
≤ (2η + δ) +
m
∑
`=m−L+1
N`
p2`
.
It remains to notice that the right handside sum is finite, and each summand N`/p2` is triv-
ially bounded by 1. Therefore ∑`≥0 N`/p2` is convergent.
Denote by S its limit. We know there exists M ∈N such that, for any m ≥ M it holds that∣∣∣∣∣S− m∑
`=0
N`
p2`
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ .
As a consequence, ∑m`=M+1 N`/p
2` ≤ 2δ and since ∑M`=0 N`/p2` ≤ S, we get
1
p2m
m
∑
`=0
N` =
M
∑
`=0
N`
p2`
1
p2(m−`)
+
m
∑
`=M+1
N`
p2`
≤ S
p2(m−M)
+ 2δ,
which concludes the proof.
5.2.3 Asymptotics of the rate of Liftη RSq(q− α) when q→ ∞ and α is fixed
Theorem 5.11. Let α ≥ 2, η ≥ 1 and p be a prime number. Define eα = blogp αc, and consider the
sequence of codes Ce = Liftη RSpe(pe− α), for e ≥ eα. Then, the information rate Re of Ce approaches
1 when e→ ∞.
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Proof. By Lemma 5.9, Wm(α) ∼m→+∞ Tm. Fix δ > 0 and let M ≥ eα such that for every
m ≥ M, Wm(α) ≥ (1− δ)Tm.
Using Theorem 5.8, we thus get
|D(pe, pe − α, η)| ≥
e−eα−1
∑
ε=0
We−ε(α)Nε
≥ (1− δ)
e−M
∑
ε=0
Te−εNε +
e−eα−1
∑
ε=e−M+1
We−ε(α)Nε
≥ (1− δ)
(
p2e −
e
∑
ε=e−M+1
Te−εNε
)
+
e−eα−1
∑
ε=e−M+1
We−ε(α)Nε
≥ (1− δ)
(
p2e − TM−1
e
∑
ε=e−M+1
Nε
)
+WM−1(α)
e−eα−1
∑
ε=e−M+1
Nε .
Then, by Lemma 5.10, both terms ∑eε=e−M+1 Nε/p2e and ∑
e−eα−1
ε=e−M+1 Nε/p
2e vanish when e →
∞. Hence we get
Re =
|D(q, q− α, η)|
p2e
→ 1 .
Example 5.12. Let us give some numerical computations of the dimension and information
rate of Liftη RSpe(pe − α) illustrating Theorem 5.11.
p η α e n = p2e k = |D(pe, pe−c, η)| R = k/n
2 2 2
3 64 25 0.3906
4 256 121 0.4727
5 1024 561 0.5479
6 4096 2513 0.6135
7 16384 10977 0.6700
8 65536 47073 0.7183
9 262144 199105 0.7595
10 1048576 833345 0.7947
2 2 16
6 4096 781 0.1907
7 16384 4944 0.3018
8 65536 26335 0.4018
9 262144 128142 0.4888
10 1048576 590885 0.5635
2 4 2
3 64 16 0.2500
4 256 71 0.2773
5 1024 331 0.3232
6 4096 1506 0.3677
7 16384 6749 0.4119
In Figure 7, we also represent the degree sets of Lift2 RS2e(2e− α) for α = 3 and e ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10}.
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(a) e = 7 (b) e = 8 (c) e = 9 (d) e = 10
Figure 7: Representation of the degree set of Lift2 RS2e(2e − α) for α = 3 and different values
of e.
5.2.4 Asymptotics of the rate of Liftη RSq(bγqc) when q→ ∞ and γ is fixed
Theorem 5.13. Let c ≥ 1, η ≥ 1 and p be a prime number. Define γ = 1− p−c, and consider the
sequence of codes Ce = Liftη RSpe(γpe), for e ≥ c + 1. Then, the information rate Re of Ce satisfies:
lim
e→∞ Re ≥
1
2η
c−1
∑
ε=0
(p−ε − p−c)2Nε .
Proof. By Proposition 5.5,
|D(pe, pe − pe−c, η)| ≥
c−1
∑
ε=0
We−ε(pe−c)Nε .
Moreover, using (7), for every fixed ε ≤ c− 1 we have
lim
e→∞We−ε(p
e−c) = p2e
(p−ε − p−c)2
2η
.
Then
lim
e→∞ Re ≥
1
2η
c−1
∑
ε=0
(p−ε − p−c)2Nε .
Example 5.14. Let us give some numerical computations, illustrating the tightness of the
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bound given in Theorem 5.13.
p η c e n = p2e k = |D(pe, pe−c, η)| R = k/n
2 2 4
5 1024 561 0.5479
6 4096 1861 0.4543
7 16384 6843 0.4177
8 65536 26335 0.4018
9 262144 103431 0.3946
10 1048576 410071 0.3911
lower bound on the asymptotic rate 0.3877
2 2 6
7 16384 10977 0.6700
8 65536 39431 0.6017
9 262144 150729 0.5750
10 1048576 590885 0.5635
lower bound on the asymptotic rate 0.5533
2 4 3
4 256 71 0.2773
5 1024 205 0.2002
6 4096 699 0.1707
7 16384 2587 0.1579
lower bound on the asymptotic rate 0.1465
5 2 2
3 15625 5789 0.3705
4 390625 132109 0.3382
5 9765625 3259709 0.3338
lower bound on the asymptotic rate 0.3328
In Figure 8, we also represent the degree sets D(2e, 2e − 2e−c, η) for p = 2, η = 2, c = 4 and
e ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}.
(a) e = 5 (b) e = 6 (c) e = 7 (d) e = 8
Figure 8: Representation of the degree set of Lift2 RS2e(2e − 2e−c) for c = 4 and different
values of e. Note that in each case, the number of differents shades of grey is constant and
equal to c.
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